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The second category consists of appellant's claim involving the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his death sentence. This matter
was not raised on direct appeal after trial. In state habeas, the Virginia
Circuit Court deemed the claim procedurally defaulted under Slayton v.
Parrigan,215 Va.27,205 S.E.2d680 (1978), cert. denied,419 U.S. 1108
(1979), which held that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may not act
as a substitute for a proper appeal based upon an objection not made at
trial.
In federal habeas, Justus did not offer cause to excuse the default.
This prompted a recommendation of dismissal of the claim under
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), which requires both a showing
of cause for not complying with state procedure and a showing of
prejudice to the defendant before a claim will be addressed by the federal
court. One of the excuses for failing to follow state procedure is
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Justus did not claim ineffective
assistance of counsel as cause for the default until after the magistrate's
recommendation of dismissal had been adopted by the U.S. District
Court. In the instant case, the 4th Circuit, citing Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478,488-89 (1986), upheld the procedural bar because the "IAC as
cause" claim had neitherbeen raised in the federal petition norpresented
to and exhausted in the state courts.
The third category consists of the last four claims. These claims
were also not raised on direct appeal and were lost by another variation
of the Murray rule. However, unlike his previous claim at state habeas,
Justus asserted ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for the default.
The state habeas court rejected the IAC claims on the merits and as a
result the underlying substantive claims fell with them.
When Justus appealed the state habeas decision to the Virginia
Supreme Court, however, he did not separately assign error to the denial
of his "IAC as cause" claims. He did raise the substantive claims
themselves, probably believing that the IAC claims would be carried
along. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the holding that the
substantive claims were defaulted under Slayton.
At federal habeas, Justus again raised his four procedurally-
defaulted substantive claims and the procedurally-defaulted IAC claims
as cause. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
underlying substantive claims could not be considered because the IAC
claims that might have kept them alive were also procedurally defaulted.
It termed this failure "double default." Justus 897 F.2d at 712.
The hair splitting analysis of this decision, based upon a process
that is already very complicated, serves to reinforce the necessity for
preserving appealable issues with the utmost care. Several valuable
lessons may be extracted. First, "ineffective assistance of counsel claims
offered as cause to excuse procedural defaults of other constitutional
claims are separate and distinct from those other constitutional claims."
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)(emphasis added). An
IAC claim and any underlying substantive claims are not inextricably
linked. Again, it is likely that counsel assumed that appeal of the state
habeas decision on the substantive issues would automatically carry the
IAC claims offered as cause for default. This is not so. IAC claims used
as "cause" under Sykes to cure a default must be separately appealed or
are themselves defaulted.
Second, there is a range of inattention by counsel which can forfeit
constitutional claims, yet not constitute ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. Sykes, recall, permits reviving an otherwise defaulted claim with a
showing of cause and prejudice. Under Sykes, the failure of counsel to
comply with state procedure can supply the "cause" prong, but only if the
failure can be characterized as so egregious as to fall below the minimal
constitutional standard described in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687-88 (1984). Both Sykes and Strickland also require a further
showing of prejudice.
Because the Strickland standard permits a great deal of bad
lawyering without terming it constitutionally deficient, (See Marlowe,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Capital Defense Digest, this issue),
there exists a Sykes-Strickland "gap." That is, an attorney may cause a
possibly life-saving claim to be barred from federal review under Sykes
and still not be ineffective under Strickland.
Sykes and Strickland are not new cases. One can argue that the bar
should realize the pitfalls of default by now such that future failure by
counsel to comply with state procedural requirements is IAC under
Strickland and "cause" under Sykes. The procedural default require-
ments in Virginia should be well known to counsel from experience in
non-capital cases. More importantly, any casual reading of Virginia
Supreme Court opinions in capital cases win reveal them to be replete
with findings that claims have been defaulted. (See Powley, Perfecting
the Record of a Capital Case in Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.) Attorneys representing death-sentenced prisoners at state or
federal habeas may wish to urge directly that the gap be closed.
Summary and analysis by:
Christopher J. Lonsbury
SAVINO v. COMMONWEALTH
239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276 (1990)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On April 24, 1989, Joseph John Savino pled guilty to a capital
murder indictment charging that he did "willfully, deliberately, feloni-
ouslyand with premeditation, kill andmurderThos 'Thomas' McWaters,
Jr. in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon," in
violation of Va. Code § 18.2-31(4). Savino also pled guilty to the
commission of the underlying robbery. By entering pleas of guilty,
Savino waived his right to ajury trial and the Commonwealth presented
its evidence in support of the indictment. Finding Savino guilty of both
capital murder and robbery, the court proceeded to the sentencing phase
of Virginia's bifurcated trial procedure. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4
(1990).
Pursuant to Savino's request, the trial court appointed a qualified
mental health expert, Dr. Lisa Hovermale, to assist Savino in the
preparation and presentation of his defense. Savino intended to present
Hovermale's testimony in support of his theory of mitigation. Adhering
to the rules prescribed by statute, he gave notice of his intention to the
Commonwealth Attorney. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3: 1(E) (1990). In
response, the Commonwealth motioned the Court, pursuant to 3:l(F) to
compel Savino to submit to an evaluation by its own expert "concerning
theexistence orabsence ofmitigating circumstances" relating to Savino's
mental condition atthe time of the murder. Savino v. Commonwealth, 239
Va. 534,391 S.E.2d 276,280-81 (1990). The court appointed Dr. Arthur
Centor, a clinical psychologist, to examine and interview Savino.
At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth presented Dr.
Centor's testimony as aggravating evidence. During his testimony,
Centor opined that Savino showed signs of future dangerousness.
Following the prosecution's use of Centor's testimony, Savino offered
Hovermale's testimony to support his theory of mitigation. Savino
objected to Centor's opinions regarding Savino's future dangerousness
as "unreliable." Additionally, Savino objected to the Commonwealth's
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questions to Centor regarding his testimony in other capital trials as
"totally irrelevant." Id. at 545, 391 S.E.2d at 282.
The trial court sentenced Savino to death. On appeal, Savino
challenged the constitutionality of Centor's testimony pertaining to
Savino's future dangerousness.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the automatic review
of Savino's death sentence with his appeal of right, and upon review,
affirmed the judgment and sentence.
Savino asserted several grounds for relief but the holdings of the
Virginia Supreme Court which merit discussion in this summary are the
following: (1) the entry of Savino's voluntary guilty plea acts as a waiver
to all challenges, including those raised at the sentencing phase, except
jurisdictional challenges; and (2) testimony by the State's psychiatrist
concerning Savino's future dangerousness following a compelled ex-
amination did not violate Savino's fifth or sixth amendment rights.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Effect of Guilty Plea
The Virginia Supreme Court refused to recognize Savino's con-
stitutional challenges to the death penalty and sentencing procedures
with the curious exception of the challenge to Centor's testimony. Id. at
539, 391 S.E.2d at 279. Because he knowingly and voluntarily pleaded
guilty to the charges and waived his right to a trial on these charges,
Savino was found to have waived all defenses except a jurisdictional
challenge.Id. at538,391 S.E.2d at 278. "A voluntary and intelligentplea
of guilty by an accused is, in reality, a self-supplied conviction authoriz-
ing imposition of the punishment fixed by law." Id. (quoting Peyton v.
King, 210 Va. 194, 169 S.E.2d 569 (1969)).
There is a real probability that the court's holding is erroneously
broad. For example, it would appear under the court's holding that the
State's procedures could provide for a conclusive presumption of future
dangerousness if Savino presented no evidence in mitigation. Savino
would have waived any objection to this unlawful procedure by his plea
of guilty at the guilt phase of the trial. However, there is no "punishment
fixed by law" in capital cases. Within constitutional confines, the
sentencing procedures must supply a guided choice between two pun-
ishments. A plea of guilty to an offense rendering one death-eligible does
not appear to be a waiver of claims that the sentencing procedure was
unconstitutional.
II. Admission of Expert Psychiatric Testimony on Future
Dangerousness at the Penalty Phase
A. Fifth Amendment Claim
Relying onEstelle v. Smith,451 U.S. 454, (1981), Savino claimed
that the Commonwealth's expert testimony in the penalty phase of the
trial violated his privilege against self-incrimination. In Estelle, the
defendant was compelled by the court to submit to a mental examination
even though he had not initiated an evaluation and did not introduce any
psychiatric evidence in mitigation. Furthermore, the psychiatrist for the
State did not advise Estelle of his right to remain silent. Finally, the
psychiatrist testified at the penalty phase of the trial that Smith would be
dangerous in the future, relying in part on his statements duringevaluation.
Id. at 456. Smith's death sentence was vacated because of the violation
of his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Id. at 454.
In the present case, Savino requested a mental examination.
Thereafter, he gave notice of his intention to use the expert's evaluation
as mitigating evidence. Relying on Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402
(1987), the Virginia Supreme Court held that when Savino gave notice
of his intention to present evidence based on the evaluation, he waived
his fifth amendment protection against the introduction of psychiatric
testimony by the State.
However, in Buchanan, the United States Supreme Court held that
when a defendant requests a psychiatric evaluation in order to prepare
and present a mental-status defense at the guilt/innocence phase, he has
waived his fifth amendment challenge to the prosecution's use of that
evaluation in rebuttal. Id. at 422-23. The United States Supreme Court
has not addressed the waiver issue relative to presentation of evidence
at the penalty phase.
B. Statutory Claim
The State's evaluation of Savino quite possibly went beyond the
scope of the statutorily-authorized examination. The Code specifies in
3:l(F), andthecourt's orderexplicitly directed, thatthe Commonwealth's
evaluation of Savino was restricted to the "existence or absence of
mitigating circumstances relating to the defendant's mental condition at
the time of the offense." Va. Code Ann. 19.2-264.3:1(F) (Repl. Vol.
1990) (emphasis added). The Code further provides that no evidence
derived from any statements or disclosures made during the
Commonwealth's capital sentencing evaluation may be introduced
against the defendant at the sentencing phase for the purpose ofproving
aggravating circumstances. Aggravating evidence obtained from these
evaluations is admissible in rebuttal only when relevant to issues first
raised by the defense. Va. Code Ann. 19.2-264.3:1 (G) (Repl. Vol.
1990)(emphasis added).
In the instantcase, the State's expert's examination and subsequent
testimony concerned the aggravating circumstance of Savino's future
dangerousness. The testimony was not limited to his mental status at the
time of the offense. Additionally, the Commonwealth presented this
aggravating evidence before Savino had presented his evidence in
support of a theory in mitigation. Unfortunately, defense counsel failed
to objectto this error atthe sentencing hearing. A proper objection would
have preserved this very important issue for appeal.
C. Sixth Amendment Claim
In Powell v. Texas, 109 S. Ct. 3146 (1989), the Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment requires that a defendant be given notice
of the State's intended use of a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant.
The Virginia Code also requires notification. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
Savino claimed that his sixth amendment right to counsel was
violated because he was never advised of the purpose of the psychiatric
evaluation by the Commonwealth. Savino, 239 Va. at 544, 391 S.E.2d
at 281. Savino relied on Estelle and Powell, in which the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the defendant's sixth amendment right to have his
attomey notified of thepurpose of any psychiatric evaluation. Estelle, 451
U.S. at 470-71; Powell, 109 S. Ct. at 3146. Savino further argued that he
was not advised that his evaluation by the Commonwealth could result
in the presentation of "future dangerousness" testimony at the sentencing
trial.
In the instant case, the Commonwealth requested and was granted
a court order for the evaluation of Savino in the language of the statute,
which itself restricts the scope of the evaluation to circumstances
relating to his mental condition at the time of the offense. Thereafter, the
testimony went beyond the authorized scope. Despite the explicit ordpr
regarding the scope of the evaluation, which echoes the codification, the
Virginia Supreme Court held that, upon the court's issuance of the order,
Savino was sufficiently notified that an examination would be conducted
by the Commonwealth's expert in an effort to produce evidence against
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Savino. Savino, 239 Va. at 544, 391 S.E.2d at 281.
As to Savino's contention that the Commonwealth failed to tell
him that its evaluation of him could result in testimony regarding his
future dangerousness, the Virginia Supreme Court held that he was
adequately notified of the purpose. The court relied on Woomerv. Aiken,
856 F.2d 677, 681 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S.Ct. 1560, (1989),
which it declared identical. However, in that case, the Fourth Circuit held
only that specific notification of the defendant is not required. Woomer,
856 F.2d at 682. Powell, which was decided after Woomer, made it very
clear that notification is necessary. Not only did Savino not get notice of
the Commonwealth's intention to make an evaluation of his mental
status for the purpose of producing evidence against him (see discussion
above), but also the statute clearly restricts the scope of his evaluation
and any testimony regarding that evaluation to his mental status at the
time of the offense. Apparently, because the Code conceivably allows
the State to use its evaluation of Savino against him for some purposes,
Savino is adequately notified by the existence of the Code authorizing
such use.
The issues above raise additional questions not addressed by the
court. If the defendant must submit to an evaluation by the Common-
wealth, which might result in an affirmative case in aggravation against
him, as a condition to even exploring the plausibility of presenting
evidence in mitigation, the defendant is put in the precarious position of
choosing between his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and sixth amendment rights to put on evidence and of assistance
of counsel. What should defense counsel do once notified of the
Commonwealth's intentions?
There are a number of options available to capital defense counsel
when considering the issues raised by use of mental health experts in
mitigation. Ultimately, each is a tactical decision which rests on the
unique aspects of a particularcase. A threshold determination is whether
a mental health expert will be helpful at all. For an expert to be useful,
or for the defense to be able to deal with the consequences, counsel must
be willing to engage in an extensive investigation into the defendant's
background before the evaluation and a followup investigation after-
ward.
If an expert's evaluation is used, and the Commonwealth responds
with a request for its own examination, counsel may either instruct the
client to say nothing or to cooperate short of making any incriminating
statements or commenting on the crime. If this option is used, a finding
under the statute could be made that the defendant refused to participate
and that any evidence from his own expert's evaluation will be precluded.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 (F) (Repl. Vol. 1990). However, there is
a substantial constitutional question raised by preclusion of evidence
which is basic to an effective defense, particularly in the context of
mitigation evidence at a capital trial. (See Bennett, Is Preclusion Under
Va. CodeAnn. 19.2-2643:1 Unconstitutional?, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 24, (1989)). Another option is that counsel could insist
on being present at any evaluation conducted by the State, on the basis
of the sixth amendment right to counsel as established in Powell. An-
other option is to cooperate fully with the Commonwealth as provided
in 3:1 while objecting vigorously and preserving the constitutional
arguments identified above.
Whenever the Commonwealth files a motion for an evaluation
pursuant to 3:1(F), defense counsel should file and argue a motion in
limine to ensure that scope of the Commonwealth's evaluation does not
exceed that authorized by 3:1. The motion in limine should also seek an
order that the expert's subsequent testimony may not be used to establish
aggravating evidence at the penalty trial.
The instant case also spotlights the nightmarish possible effects of
a voluntary guilty plea in Virginia. In non-capital cases, entry of a guilty
plea may be a sound tactical choice. However, many, if not most, such
non-capital cases are not appealed in the federal or state system. Quite
the opposite is true in capital cases. Especially considering the scope of
the waiver doctrine announced by the Virginia Supreme Court, guilty
pleas should not be entered to a charge of capital murder absent formal
or very strong informal agreements that a life sentence will be imposed.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. Mclnerney
MU'MIN v. COMMONWEALTH
239 Va. 433,389 S.E.2d 886 (1990)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Dawud Majid Mu'Min was an inmate serving a sentence for first
degree murder. While assigned to a work detail for the Virginia De-
partment of Transportation, he eluded supervision. After walking a mile
along Interstate 95, he entered a retail carpet store and, according to his
testimony, asked the operator about oriental rugs. A violent episode
occurred. He removed several dollars from the scene and returned to the
work crew.
The store operator, near death, was found with her blouse and
brassiere pulled up above her breasts. She was also naked below the
waist. The autopsy report indicated numerous bruises and lacerations as
well as a deep puncture wound to the the left lung and the neck. The
victim's genital area was undisturbed.
Mu'Min was found guilty of capital murder in the commission of
a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, and of capital murder
while the accused was a prisoner confined in a State or local correctional
facility. Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-31(4), 18.2-31(3) (1990). He was
acquitted on a third charge of capital murder in the commission of or
subsequent to rape. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (1990).
HOLDING
Some claims and holdings of this case are not discussed in this
summary because they are either too fact specific or are treated in too
conclusory a fashion to lend guidance to the bar. The holdings of the
Virginia Supreme Court which merit discussion in this summary be-
cause of their potential value to practitioners include the following: (1)
refusing to allow defendant to ask "content questions" to determine what
pretrial publicity prospective jurors had been exposed to is not a denial
of due process of law or a violation of the right to trial by an impartial
jury; (2) it is immaterial to the validity of the death sentence that the
Commonwealth's bill of particulars did not contain the word "torture"
when the aggravating factor of vileness can otherwise be established; (3)
multiple grievous wounds are sufficient to prove torture; and (4) a
prospective juror expressing work related concerns over jury duty need
not be excused unless such concerns involve a personal hardship.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
1. Voir Dire and Publicity
